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Watsuji’s Ethics from the Perspective  
of Kata as a Technology of the Self
This paper investigates the history of systems of thought different from 
those of the West. A closer look at Japan’s long philosophical tradition 
draws attention to the presence of uniquely designed acculturation and 
training techniques designed as kata or shikata (型 or 仕形), shedding light 
on kata as a generic technique of self-perfection and self-transformation. 
By seeing kata as foundational to the Japanese mind and comparing it to 
Michel Foucault’s research on technologies of the self, the groundwork 
is laid for a comparative analysis in terms of the principle of ἐπιμελείσθαι 
σαυτού (taking care of oneself ), an ethical and aesthetic paradigm dating 
back to European antiquity. Not only does this bring to light their simi-
larities as techniques of individuation, it also reinforces the importance of 
Watsuji’s relational understanding of human being.
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The word kata is used in Japanese to refer to a set of uniquely designed acculturation and training techniques and practices known as shikata 
or kata. Contemporary research has neglected the importance of kata, 
whose various expressions developed over centuries, in favor of notions like 
ambiguity (曖昧さ), dependency (甘え), the Japanese sense of beauty (美学) 
and even bushidō (武士道, the way of the samurai). In so doing, a fundamen-
tal pillar of the Japanese pursuit of self-transformation and a potential key 
to a more comprehensive understanding of the Japanese mind has fallen by 
the wayside. Admittedly the idea of kata is as elusive to scholars at home as 
it has been to their counterparts in the West. This is not to say that we lack 
resources on the subject but only that the notion of kata itself does not seem 
to have received the fuller attention it deserves.1
Kata or shikata refers to a particular way of doing things that puts the 
emphasis on the form and order of an actual process. Analyzing the etymol-
ogy of the compound term shikata, we see that shi 仕 has the double sense 
of support and serve, while kata 型 or 形 commonly translates as form or pat-
tern. Boyé De Mente has defined kata as a relationship between
an inner order (the individual heart) and a natural order (the cosmos), and 
these two were linked together by form—by kata. It was kata that linked the 
individual and society.2
In his view, kata is to be seen as a sort of repetitive self-actualizing process or 
action, while at the same time it serves the formal function of unifying the 
1. One notable scholar known for his extensive research on the topic of kata is Minamoto 
Ryōen. Unfortunately, none of his works have been translated into English and the only 
available reference to his comprehensive work on this subject remains the excerpt in Heisig, 
Kasulis, Maraldo 2011, 930–5. 
2. DeMente 2003, 15.
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physical and the spiritual aspects of the human existence. It is not a question 
of embodying or harmonizing with any universal, metaphysical principles. 
Kata is not a vehicle for conveying hidden truths or uncovering the inner 
nature of things, rather it is simply a model for shaping interrelational experi-
ence. De Mente further argues the institutional and ritual characteristics of 
kata suggest a connection with morality in the sense that one’s actions can 
be said to be “in kata” or “out of kata” (型にはまる・はまらない). To be “out 
of kata” is to oppose reason or the will of society, and in this sense, as we 
shall see, puts us in touch with the foundations of ethics in Japan.
Watsuji’s rinri and aidagara in relation to kata
Watsuji Tetsurō’s major work Rinrigaku (Ethics)3 offers an origi-
nal and critical perspective on modern attempts to ground ethics solely on 
the actions and decisions of the conscious individual subject. Watsuji argues 
against western conceptions of human being that put the individual at the 
center of all modes of existence and then substitute it for the totality of all 
human existence . This view of the world, Watsuji claims, can be traced back 
to the assumption that the isolated ego is the proper starting point for mod-
ern philosophy.4 When this approach is applied to the field of ethics and the 
existential problems that face us as human beings, it ends up with a flawed 
account of human agency for the simple reason that the solitary, isolated 
subject is merely an abstraction from a wider complex of interpersonal rela-
tionships. Consequently, this fixation on the isolated ego as a conceptual 
pivot distracts attention from what Watsuji sees as the true starting point 
for ethics: concrete human existence with an emphasis on human beings as 
contemplating subjects. This is why he insists that ethical problems can-
not properly be framed without reliance on ideas such as social happiness 
or human welfare, therefore ethics cannot rely on individual consciousness 
3. This paper is a result of multiple presentations aimed at expanding my earlier research by 
encompassing Watsuji’s use of the notion of rin as an expression of kata. In my doctoral thesis 
(Sekulovski 2013) I argue that François Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy, as an all-encom-
passing posture and practice of Man, has similarities to the notion of kata and can therefore 
help generate new forms of what Laruelle calls generic knowledge.
4. Watsuji, 1996, 11.
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alone and needs to give way to a more relational and interdependent under-
standing of human being. 
Kata and the Grand “rin” of human beings
While Watsuji acknowledges that the notion of rinri (倫理 the Sino-Japanese 
term for ethics) is rooted in ancient Chinese thought, he makes it clear that 
he does not intend to argue for a revival or modern reconstruction of the 
Chinese classics in order to restore the significance of ethics as a Way. Rather, 
he attempts to situate ethics firmly and irrevocably within human relation-
ships, and to center its attention on what goes on in the “in-between,” on 
the actions and consequences that arise in interactions among individuals. 
Watsuji understands the glyph rin to carry the sense of nakama (なかま) or 
“fellowship,” that is to say, a system of relationships among a given group of 
individuals that determines their mode of human existence. Nakama is thus 
intended not as an abstract logical principle but as a concrete point of ref-
erence to the interactions that bring people into contact with one another. 
At the same time, Watsuji continues, rin includes the dimension of kimari 
(決まり) agreement) or kata (form) as the basis of bringing order (秩序) to 
human relationships. In a word, rin is the Way of human beings. 
Watsuji understands the second glyph, ri, to connote a general sense of 
rationality. It refers to the patterns of activity or relationship that can be 
seen to take place in the fellowship of rin:
Therefore, rinri, that is, ethics, is the order or the pattern through which the 
communal existence of human beings is rendered possible. In other words, 
ethics consists of the laws of social existence.5
The significance of rin, as nakama, kimari, and therefore also kata, consti-
tutes the order among human beings, in this manner, rin, kata, and, aidagara 
are correlated in such a manner that the latter empowers the rin (as a form) 
rendering it possible and empowering its continuity. 
What lies in-between?
On this basis, Watsuji postulates:
5. Watsuji 1996, 11.
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The locus of ethical problems lies not in the consciousness of the isolated 
individual, but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person. Because 
of this, ethics is the study of ningen.6 
It is precisely the emphasis of this “in-betweenness” among individuals 
that allows Watsuji to rethink the concept of ethics and move away from 
the kind of individual-centered ethics that runs deep in the philosophical 
traditions of the West. There is no way to get at the heart of ethical problems 
solely in reliance on the experiences and contemplative efforts of individu-
als. Attention to the in-betweenness of person and person is crucial if we are 
to shift ethics away from regulative principles and the clarification of moral 
responsibilities towards our fellow human beings and towards the study of 
the human. The Japanese word Watsuji uses for “human” is composed of two 
characters: nin or hito (人), meaning person or human being, and gen or aida 
(間) meaning space or between. Watsuji insists that a human being is not 
simply an individual but a member of various social groupings, and as such 
should be defined fundamentally as a “we” rather than as an “I.” Accord-
ingly, “to be an I” means “to be a part of a correlative we,” that is, a “we” 
composed of multiple “I”s. This in turn implies that for a human individual 
to “exist” means to “be among” one’s fellow human beings. This essential 
correlatedness is what Watsuji calls aidagara or betweenness. 
The term aidagara is composed of two glyphs: aida or gen, referred to 
in the previous paragraph, and gara (柄), which can mean nature or—more 
in keeping with Watsuji’s usage—pattern. Putting the two together, then, 
aidagara translates literally as a “between pattern” or more simply, a rela-
tionship. The appearance of the same glyph 間 in both ningen and aidagara 
has nothing to do with the physical distance between individuals. If Wat-
suji’s notion of “in-betweeness” were basically spatial, it might easily be dis-
missed as a kind of naïve realism. Avoiding that sense complicates our efforts 
to translate the word in the various contexts in which it is used. At times, 
among helps elucidate its intended meaning, as in the phrase among one’s 
fellow human beings. In any case, the “space” that gara refers to is a mid-place 
in-between individuals, not a place that exists prior their interaction. This 
mid-place is defined, in turn, by an all-encompassing form or rin of human 
6. Ibid., 10.
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relationships that are individuated among and within the interrelational pat-
tern. To capture this all-inclusive interrelationality in which individuals are 
wrapped up, we might better render the word aidagara “with-in” instead of 
the usual “in-between.”
Foucault’s technologies of the self  
in late antiquity
Michel Foucault argued that the pursuit of ethical and aestheti-
cal ideals in European antiquity stressed the importance of a unified prac-
tice and theory to empower a particular aesthetic of existence. The ancient 
principle of ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σεαυτόν or taking care of oneself stands behind the 
time-worn idea of caring not only for one’s body but also and primarily for 
one’s mind or soul. This ideal flourished at a time in European history when 
the view of the human being as an individual agent was taking shape and 
thus enabled the emergence of a specific set of what Foucault liked to call 
“technologies of self-creation.”7 These acculturation and training techniques 
allowed individuals to pursue, alone or with help of others, a course of disci-
plined practice for body, soul, thought, conduct, and overall state of being. 
The aim was a self-transformation that would usher in a state of happi-
ness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or even immortality. As a result, the guid-
ing principle of taking care of oneself was replaced with the principle γνῶθι 
σεαυτόν, know thyself. 
This shift of direction in intellectual practice affected the subsequent ori-
entation of European civilization, accentuating the place of reason and the 
role of the contemplating subject while at the same time sidelining tech-
nologies of the self nurtured under the earlier ideal of taking care of oneself. 
To this day, Foucault argues, western culture is guided by the principle of 
knowing thyself, effectively enshrining the individualist spirit as the very 
epitome of what it means to be human. Numerous ancient cultures, like 
the Greeks, fostered an interest at various times throughout their history in 
techniques and aesthetic practices aimed at enhancing existence, in modes 
of individuation and forms of self-discipline carried out through observa-
tion and experimentation whose only goal was to transform and better one-
7. For further details, see Foucault 1984. 
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self. In the case of Japan, the same kata that played a role in morality was 
also employed to facilitate and mediate one’s pursuit of a certain aesthetics 
of existence. As was the case with the ancient Greeks, kata was also equated 
with beauty.
Kata as a technology of the self
As disciplines for body, mind, and conduct aimed at achieving 
purity, wisdom, and perfection, kata and the ancient principle of taking care 
of oneself appear to be interchangeable. A consideration of the Tea Cere-
mony, one of the most emblematic of the traditional arts of Japan, bears this 
out. Chadō (茶道), the Way of Tea, is based on the use of kata and its prin-
ciples reflect the will to master oneself through various disciplines of body, 
mind, and conduct. Precepts of chadō like harmony (和), respect (敬), purity 
(清) and tranquility (寂) show striking similarities to precepts articulated in 
European antiquity. The influence of Zen Buddhism on chadō and other tra-
ditional arts has carried over to Japanese modes of living and ways of think-
ing in general. In the same way, the use of kata came to serve as a generic 
technique for the self-creation and self-transformation of individuals, thus 
expanding its impact on Japanese society as a whole. The shift in paradigms 
that Foucault points out in Europe does not directly apply to Japan, where 
the old paradigm has survived down the centuries. Simply put, we may say 
that kata serves as a means of practical connection or fellowship, and that 
these specific forms or patterns circumscribe the topology of human interac-
tion within which human relationships take place. 
Kata as a dynamic principle
Watsuji defines these kata of practical interaction as something that
cannot itself exist apart from these connections. As specific forms in which 
human beings act, they exist only together with these practical connections. 
But when dynamic human existence is actualized repeatedly, in a definite 
manner, we can grasp this pattern that constantly makes its appearance in 
separation from the basis of this dynamic sort of existence. 8 
8. Watsuji 1996, 11.
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The repetition of kata in a defined manner discloses the pattern of relation-
ships within which human beings define themselves. 
John Maraldo points out that Watsuji’s conception of ningen rep-
resents a dynamic concept of the self in which identity is not fixed or 
determined but shaped interrelationally, in-between person and person, 
and thus subject to continual change. For Watsuji, to be human is also to 
be ethical, and one cannot be either unless one is both an individual and 
at the same time correlated to others. Watsuji, we recall, defined ethical 
conduct as the order or the pattern through which the communal exis-
tence of human beings is rendered possible; in other words, to be ningen 
means to navigate freely between the social and the individual. Maraldo 
goes on so say that ningen,
although being subjective communal existence as the interconnection of acts, 
at the same time, is an individual that acts through these connections. This 
subjective and dynamic structure does not allow us to account for ningen as a 
‘thing’ or ‘substance.’9 
To be ningen is to stand in a dynamic relationship—between the indi-
vidual and the social, never just one or the other—and therefore cannot be 
conceived of in terms of a stable or complete structure or mode of being. 
Watsuji conceives ningen both as an individual and at the same time as a 
subjective communal existence, pointing at the non-dualist character of 
ningen seen as a totality of human beings established through the negation 
of individuality and expressed through the relational existence or pattern in-
between person and person.
In this vein, Watsuji remarks of human existence that it
infinitely aims at the realization of communal existence by virtue that human 
beings are ningen. Because of this, the pattern of practical connections 
already realized serves, at the same time, as a pattern yet to be achieved.10 
This pattern of connections and its resultant ethic are regarded not as 
a goal to be reached but as something that needs to be achieved infinitely. 
It is, we may say, a kata that allows human existence to be realized as com-
9. Maraldo 2002, 185. 
10. Watsuji 1996, 12.
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munal existence. Its inclusive character provides for the emergence of the 
in-between or aidagara as an essential dimension of existence for ningen, a 
dimension in which the in-between is not an empty void but a form with an 
individuating function. The elusive character of this kata of interconnected-
ness accounts for its role as a pillar of the nondual, communal existence of 
ningen in-between the social and individual. As such, kata is not metaphysi-
cal in nature but relational. It presents as a model that give shape to aida, the 
with-in. For these reasons, I am persuaded that kata is the most fundamental 
constituent in the makeup of the Japanese mind in the sense that it defines 
the respective roles and forms that constitute the actual relational matrix of 
each individual rin in relation to the totality of ningen. 
Concluding remarks
The foregoing has tried to present a rationale for comparative 
research on the notion of kata in relation to Foucault’s research on the tech-
nologies of the self in the ancient Greco-Roman world, and to suggest fur-
ther examination of the role of kata as a fundamental pillar and technique 
for individual self-creation and self-transformation in Japan. My aim was to 
highlight possible commonalities between alternative systems of thought 
that appear at first to be closed in on themselves and inaccessible to one 
another. There is no doubt that common practices are a way to enhance 
mutual understanding. Further attention to the role played by kata in shap-
ing the aesthetics of existence in Japan can make a contribution in the same 
direction. 
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